A Ghanaian citizen, Sophia Korkor, has sued the Attorney General at the Supreme Court, seeking, among other things, a declaration that the conduct of the Police and officers of security agencies in setting bail conditions for persons invited for investigation be declared unconstitutional.
The Plaintiff is also seeking an order of perpetual injunction restraining security agencies from setting bail conditions without court involvement for suspects, persons of interest, or witnesses.
The writ, which invokes the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution and Rule 45(1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Rules, was filed on May 20, 2026, by the Plaintiff through her lawyers at Robert Smith Law Group led by Bobby Banson Esq.
The writ seeks 10 major reliefs comprising seven declaratory reliefs and three orders.
The crux of the Plaintiff’s action is to challenge the constitutionality of the conduct of the Police and other security agencies in setting bail conditions for persons under investigation prior to those persons being arraigned before a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the facts of the present action are not in dispute.
The Plaintiff, therefore, does not intend to call any witnesses of fact in respect of her claim.
The Plaintiff, by her writ, is urging the Apex Court to invoke the time-honoured practice of the Court in making a determination of such matters of constitutional interpretation based on the statements of case filed by the respective parties.
The Plaintiff is essentially inviting the Apex Court to take judicial notice of the practice of personnel of State Agencies—the Ghana Police Service, Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), and National Security (NS)—who are neither judges nor magistrates, exercising the discretion to set bail conditions for persons involved in investigations for allegations of crime once such persons come into their custody, be they suspects, persons of interest, or witnesses.
The Attorney General is sued in his capacity as the principal legal adviser to the Government of Ghana pursuant to Article 88(1) of the 1992 Constitution, and as the proper person against and on behalf of whom an action may be instituted on behalf of the State pursuant to Article 88(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and Section 9(1) of the State Proceedings Act, 1998 (Act 555), and more particularly because an allegation of unconstitutionality is in issue.
Reliefs Sought
i. A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14(1)(a,)(c) (g), Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, it is only a court of competent jurisdiction that can grant bail to a person on conditions set by the court, be it anticipatory bail or post-arrest bail.
ii.A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14(1) (a,) (c) (g), Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, the right of a person to be released within 48 hours of arrest, unless brought before a court of competent jurisdiction is unequivocal and not subject to said person meeting conditions set by the arresting entity or person.
iii. A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14 (1)(a) (c) (g), Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution no arresting body including officers in a security agency in Ghana, has the authority to exercise discretion in determining the bail conditions of persons suspected of having committed or about to commit a crime.
iv. A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14 (1) (a) (c) (g), Article 14 (3), Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, the conduct of police or officers of security agencies setting bail conditions for persons invited in investigations whether as suspects, persons of interest or witnesses is unconstitutional.
v. A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 296 (c) of the 1992 Constitution, an arresting officer of any security agency cannot exercise a discretion to set bail conditions in the absence of any Constitutional Instrument or Statutory Instrument that governs the exercise of such discretion to determine bail conditions.
vi. A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 19 (2) (c) read together with Article 14(3) in this digital age, the State agencies exercising police powers ought to use Video Recorded Interviews (VRI) to facilitate realisation of the spirit of the 48-hour rule and to prevent conditions that conduce to custodial dealings with persons helping in investigations.
vii. A declaration that the provisions of section 15 (2) of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) is inconsistent with and contravenes the spirit and letter of Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution.
viii. An order striking down the provisions of section 15 (2) of the Criminal and
Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) as being inconsistent with and contravening the spirit and letter of Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution.
ix. An order directed at all officers exercising police powers to comply with the spirit of Article 19(2)(c) by indicating in their invitation to persons required in investigation whether they are invited as suspects, persons of interest or witnesses to facilitate the procurement of anticipatory bail by any such person.
c. An order of perpetual injunction restraining Security Agencies, including all persons exercising police powers, from setting of bail conditions without the court’s involvement for persons brought within their custody in investigations whether as suspects, as persons of interest, or as witnesses
Story by: Murtala Inusah
